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Mapping the contours of The Experimental Use exemption:
35 U.S.C. x 271(e)(1)'s Past, Present, and Future
A patent is a device to prevent the diusion of
new methods before the original investor has re-
covered prot adequate to induce the requisite
investment. The justication of the patent sys-
tem is that by slowing down the diusion of tech-
nical progress it ensures that there will be more
progress to diuse.... Since it is rooted in contra-
diction, there can be no such thing as an ideally
benecial patent system, and it is bound to pro-
duce negative results in particular instances, im-
peding progress unnecessarily even if its general
eect is favorable on balance.1
\If without fear of liability a competitor can assemble a patented item past the
point of testing, [then] the... patent becomes worthless."2
I. Introduction
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restora-
tion Act (DPCPTR).3This Act, which resulted from the lobbying eorts of both
1Joan Robinson, The Accumulation of Capital 87 (1956).
2Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 19 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
3Pub. L. No. 98-417, Title II, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codied as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.). This Act is also known as the \Hatch-Waxman Act," for
its two original sponsors, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Representative Henry Waxman
(D-California).
1the pharmaceutical industry and consumer interest groups,4 was intended to en-
courage greater expenditure in the area of pharmaceutical invention while simul-
taneously ensuring greater competition immediately after the expiration of the
relevant patents.5 \By rectifying distortions in the patent system created by the
Food and Drug Administration's [FDA's] regulatory approval process, Congress
struck a balance between the interests of pharmaceutical companies,... com-
peting `generic' manufacturers," and consumers.6The Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act created several modications to conventional
patent law, including:
 Provisions allowing for the extension of the normal term of a patent for
up to ve years to compensate a patent owner for the marketing time allegedly
lost in satisfying government regulations requiring proof that a drug is safe and
eective before it can be marketed.7
4See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 16{18 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2686; William T. Christiansen, Patent Term Extension of Pharma-
ceuticals in Japan: So you Say You Want to Rush That Generic Drug to Market in Japan....
Good Luck!, 6 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 613, 616 (1997) (outlining the history of the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984).
5See Samuel M. Kais, A Survey of 35 U.S.C. x 271(e)(1) as Interpreted by the Courts:
The Infringement Exemption Created by the 1984 Patent Term Restoration Act, 13 Santa
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 575, 576 (1997); Amy Stark, The Exemption from
Patent Infringement and Declaratory Judgments: Misinterpretation of Legislative Intent?, 31
San Diego L. Rev. 1057, 1059 (1994).
6Kais, supra note 5, at 576. Referring to the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, Senator Orrin Hatch observed that the statute \represented a nely tuned
balance which reected the dynamics of the healthcare marketplace." Reginald Rhein,
BIO, PhRMA Call For Longer Patent Lives to Make Up for FDA Review Lags, Biotech.
Newswatch, Mar. 18, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8452664 (quoting Sen. Hatch). Senator
Hatch also noted that \on the one end was the need of the innovator drug companies to rely
on adequate intellectual property protection to ensure that they attract sucient capital for
research and development [while] on the other end were the edgling generic drug companies,
who were not able to bring their products to market quickly because of the FDA approval
process and the patent law." Id.
7Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived
Their Usefulness? A Political, Legislative and Legal History of U.S. Law and Observations
for the Future, 39 IDEA: J.L. & Tech. 389, 390 (1999) (citing 35 U.S.C. x 156 (1994)).
2 Special procedures for challenging the validity or infringement of drug
patents which, in eect, guaranteed the patent owner a statutory preliminary
injunction for a period of thirty months unless the adjudication was completed in
a shorter time.8 A \bounty" for challenging patent validity, infringement or
enforceability in the form of 180 days of market exclusivity to the rst generic
applicant to le a patent challenge against any approved drug.9 A novel
statutory exemption from claims of patent infringement for those acts of making,
using, or selling a patented invention which are reasonably related to seeking
FDA approval to market a drug, provided that no commercial use of a patented
invention occurs before the patent expires.10
This essay reviews this nal provision, x 271(e)(1), which established that
the use of an invention does not constitute patent infringement if that use is
\reasonably related" to obtaining federal approval to market pharmaceutical or
veterinary products.11 Section 271(e)(1) creates a \safe harbor"12 that reads:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, oer to sell, or sell within
the United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other
than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used
in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the act of March 4, 1913)
which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA,
hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specic genetic manip-
ulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.13
This essay examines the history and legislative intent behind x 271(e)(1)'s
8Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. x 355(c) (1994) and 35 U.S.C. x 271(e)(2){(4) (1994)). Collectively,
these provisions are referred to as the \patent certication procedures of the Act. See id. at
391 n.6.
9Id. at 391 (citing 21 U.S.C. x 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1994)).
10Id. at 390 (citing 35 U.S.C. x 271(e)(1) (1994)).
11See Brian D. Coggio & Francis D. Cerrito, The Application of the Patent Laws to the
Drug Approval Process, 52 Food & Drug L.J. 345, 345 (1997).
12See, e.g., Courtenay C. Brinckerho, Can the Safe Harbor of 35 U.S.C. x 271(e)(1)
Shelter Pioneer Drug Manufacturers?, 53 Food & Drug L.J. 643 (1998); Coggio & Cerrito,
supra note 11, at 345{47.
1335 U.S.C. x 271(e)(1).
3enactment, the statute's subsequent interpretation by the courts, and the role
that the provision may play in the future in order to illustrate the inherent
tensions between the FDA's drug approval process and the patent law and to
highlight the diculty of balancing the needs of consumers, pharmaceutical
innovators, and generic drug companies.
II. The Origins of the Experimental Use Doctrine | Creation and
Early Development
A. Whittemore v. Cutter and Its Progeny
4Over 150 years before the patent law was amended to include x
271(e)(1), seeds for the statute's enactment were sown in Whittemore
v. Cutter,14 in an opinion written by Justice Story while sitting on
the Massachusetts Circuit Court.15 In Whittemore, the defendant
challenged the lower court's jury instruction \that the making of a
machine t for use, and with a design to use it for prot, was an
infringement of the patent right."16 Justice Story approved of the in-
struction, stating that \it could never have been the intention of the
legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely
for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the
suciency of the machine to produce the described eects."17
That same year, in Sawin v. Guild,18 Justice Story again referred to
this exemption from the patent law for experimental use. In holding
that the defendant's sale of a patented machine for cutting brad nails
constituted patent infringement, Justice Story observed that the ma-
chine had been sold \with an intent to use for prot" rather than
\for the mere purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain
the verity and exactness of the specication."19 In order for there to
be infringement, Justice Story asserted, \the making must be with
an intent to infringe the patent-right, and deprive the owner of the
lawful rewards of his discovery."20
In both Whittemore and Sawin, Justice Story's references to an ex-
emption from the patent law for experimental use were dicta, and as
a result, the early course of the exception was far from clear. Very
few early courts applied the experimental use doctrine to excuse the
use of a patented invention that would otherwise constitute infringe-
ment.21 Nevertheless, most commentators agree that the common
law of patents provides for an exemption from infringement for ex-
perimental use to ascertain the validity and exact specications of a
patent, in order to enable an individual to challenge a patent on the
grounds of non-enablement or inutility.22
1429 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
15See Suzanne T. Michel, The Experimental Use Exception to Infringement Applied to
Federally Funded Inventions, 7 High Tech. L.J. 369, 371 (1992).
16Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
17Id.
1821 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
19Id. at 555 (internal citation omitted).
20Id.
21See Michel, supra note 15, at 372; see also Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an
Exception to Patent Infringement, 67 J. Pat. & Trademark O. Soc'y 617 (1985) (outlining
the history of the experimental use exception from its creation to the Federal Circuit's opinion
in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.). Despite the skepticism with which
courts greeted the doctrine, however, by 1861, the law was \well-settled that an experiment
with a patented article for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or
for mere amusement is not an infringement of the of the rights of the patentee." Peppenhausen
v. Falke, 19 Fed. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279).
22See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
5The scope of Justice Story's \philosophical experimentation" exception has
been more dicult for courts and commentators to dene, however, because of
the inherent ambiguity of that phrase.23Early courts seeking to apply this prong
of Justice Story's exception typically focused on the experimental nature of the
conduct, without elaborating upon the meaning of \philosophical experimen-
tation."24 Thus, other than establishing that commercial use and commercial
Experimental Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017, 1074 (1989) (\The case of an experimental use
exemption is strongest when the subsequent researcher is using a patented invention to check
the validity of the patent holder's claims. Free access to patented inventions for the limited
purpose of permitting scrutiny of new research claims serves the policies underlying the patent
law as well as the interests of research science. Indeed, patent law promotes scrutiny of the
research claims embodied in patented inventions through its requirement that patent holders
make enabling disclosures of their inventions freely available to the public."); Michel, supra
note 15, at 372 (\[T]he second prong of Justice Story's test which allows activity for `ascertain-
ing the verity and exactness of the specication' does appear to be `well-settled."'). The
experimental use exception appears to have become xed in American patent jurisprudence
when Professor Robinson summarized the exception and included the doctrine in his treatise
on patents. See W. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions x 898 (1890): x 898.
No Act an Infringement unless it Aects the Pecuniary Interests of the Owner of the Patented
Invention. [T]he interest to be promoted by the wrongful employment of the invention must
be hostile to the interest of the patentee. The interest of the patentee is represented by the
emoluments which he does or might receive from the practice of the invention by himself or
others. These, though not always taking the shape of money, are of a pecuniary character,
and their value is capable of estimation like other property. Hence acts of infringement must
attack the right of the patentee to these emoluments, and either turn them aside into other
channels or prevent them from accruing in favor of any one. An unauthorized sale of the
invention is always such an act. But the manufacture or the use of the invention may be
intended only for other purposes, and produce no pecuniary result. Thus where it is made
or used as an experiment, whether for the gratication of scientic tastes, or for curiosity, or
for amusement, the interests of the patentee are not antagonized, the sole eect being of an
intellectual character in the promotion of the employer's knowledge or the relaxation aorded
to his mind. But if the products of the experiment are sold, or used for the convenience of
the experimentor, or if the experiments are conducted with a view to the adaptation of the
invention to the experimentor's business, the acts of making or of use are violations of the
rights of the inventor and infringements of his patent. In reference to such employments of
a patented invention the law is diligent to protect the patentee, and even experimental uses
will be sometimes enjoined though no injury may have resulted admitting of positive redress.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
23See, e.g., Michel, supra note 15, at 372 (noting that the scope of the philosophical exper-
imentation prong is less clear than the \ascertaining the verity and exactness of the speci-
cation" prong).
24See, e.g., Ned A. Israelsen, Making, Using, Selling Without Infringing: An Examination
of 35 U.S.C. Section 271(e) and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 16
Am. Intell. Prop. L. Ass'n Q.J. 457, 460 n.11 & n.14 (1989); Michel, supra note 15, at
372.
6intent forestalled application of the exception, these cases did little to establish
its contours.25
In more recent years, however, the exception for philosophical experimenta-
tion has been both more clearly dened and more narrowly construed. In Pit-
cairn v. United States,26the Court of Claims refused to apply the experimental
use exception because there was a business purpose underlying the infringing
action.27The court concluded that the experimental use exception was not avail-
able as a defense to infringement because the nature of the tests, demonstrations,
and experiments conducted, which included testing a helicopter for lifting abil-
ity, ight speed, range, and numerous other factors, were within the legitimate
business of the defendant.28Thus, patented products that were not built solely
for experimental use, although primarily used for testing and experimental pur-
poses, were excluded from the experimental use exception.29According to the
reasoning of the Pitcairn court, for an experimental use to be non-infringing un-
der Justice Story's test, the use must be strictly for amusement, for satisfying
idle curiosity, or for philosophical inquiry.30A second modern case to address
25See Michel, supra note 15, at 372.
26547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
27See id. at 1125{26 (holding that the government's experimental use of patented products
in helicopters was infringing because the tests had a legitimate business purpose).
28See id.
29See id. at 1124{26.
30See Todd A. Rathe, Patent Law | Medical Device Experimental Use Exception in Patent
Infringement: Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, 16 J. Corp. L. 625, 631 (1991) (internal citations
omitted).
7the scope of Justice Story's philosophical experimentation prong was Pzer,
Inc. v. International Rectier Corp.31In this case, the federal district court for
the Central District of California held that International Rectier's manufac-
ture and use of doxycycline, a pharmaceutical compound patented by Pzer,
for bioequivalency and serum level tests, infringed Pzer's patent.32Although
International Rectier claimed that these tests were both solely experimental
and necessary in order to obtain approval of its generic drug from the FDA,
the court interpreted the history of the experimental use doctrine as suggesting
that \the underlying rule of permissible experimental use demands that there
must be no intended commercial use of the patented article, none whatsoever, if
the exception is to be recognized at all."33Thus, because International Rectier
intended to place its generic drug would in direct commercial competition with
Pzer's doxycycline after the expiration of Pzer's patent, the court held that
the experimental use exception was inapplicable.34
B. The Federal Circuit's Decision | Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co.
In 1984, the then newly created Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
rst considered the scope of the experimental use doctrine in Roche Products,
31217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 157 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
32See id. at 158{59.
33Id. at 161.
34See id. at 163.
8Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.35This case arose out of a dispute between
Roche Products, Inc., a large research-oriented pharmaceutical company, and
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., a manufacturer of generic drugs. In early 1983,
Bolar began investigating the possibility of marketing a generic drug equivalent
to Roche's patented sleeping drug, Dalmane, after the expiration of Roche's
patent.36Bolar immediately began working to obtain federal approval to market
its generic equivalent of Dalmane. Bolar did not want to wait for Roche's
patent to expire before taking steps to achieve FDA approval of its equivalent
drug \[b]ecause a generic drug's commercial success is related to how quickly
it is brought on the market, after a patent expires[,] [a]nd because approval for
an equivalent of an established drug can take more than two years."37In mid-
1983, Bolar began to perform tests on the active ingredient claimed in Roche's
patent in order to obtain stability data and dissolution rates and to perform the
bioequivalency and blood serum studies necessary for a New Drug Application
(NDA) to the Food and Drug Administration.38
Upon learning of Bolar's actions, Roche led a complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking to enjoin Bolar from taking,
during the life of Roche's patent, the statutory and regulatory steps necessary
35733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
36See id. at 860.
37Id.
38See id. The active ingredient claimed in Roche's patent was urazepam hydrochloride
(urazepam hcl).
9to market a generic version of Dalmane after its patent expired.39Bolar was
subsequently granted a change of venue and the case was transferred to the
federal district court for the Eastern District of New York.40After reviewing
the case law and recognizing the limitation that the experimental use doctrine
places on the patent right, the court held that Bolar's generic drug testing was an
experimental use.41The court concluded that although Bolar's experimentation
could not \be classied as merely for amusement or philosophical gratication[,]
[a]t the same time, it [could] not be connected with any act of competition or
prot during the term of the patent in either domestic or foreign markets. Its
experimentation is commercial preparation of a non-production nature for post-
expiration competition."42Because Bolar realized no benet during the term of
Roche's patent and because Bolar's activities did not reduce Roche's prots
during the patent's term, the district court concluded that Bolar's use of the




41See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 572 F. Supp. 255, 257 (E.D.N.Y.
1983), rev'd, 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
42Id.
43See id. at 258 (\[T]he court cannot nd a basis for holding that Bolar's limited exper-
imental use of [the patented drug] would constitute infringement. First, Bolar realizes no
benet during the term of the patent; its activities are in no way connected with current
manufacture or sale here or abroad. Nor do its activities lessen Roche's prots during the
patent term."); see also Roche, 733 F.2d at 861 (noting that the lower court held that Bolar's
use was de minimus and experimental); Rathe, supra note 30, at 631.
10On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's holding that
Bolar did not infringe Roche's patent, stating that:44
The district court correctly recognized that the issue in this case is narrow:
does the limited use of a patented drug for testing and investigation strictly
related to FDA drug approval requirements during the last six months of the
term of the patent constitute a use which, unless licensed, the patent statute
makes actionable? The district court held that it does not. This was an error
of law.45
The court began by observing that it is well-established that the use of a
patented invention, even without manufacture or sale, is actionable infringe-
ment.46Although further noting that the word \use," as it occurs in x 271(a),
\has never been taken to its utmost possible scope," the court rejected Bolar's
argument that its intended use of urazepam hcl fell within the experimen-
tal use exception.47The court determined that the experimental use exception
is \truly narrow" and should not be expanded under the circumstances of the
case.48Applying the reasoning of Pitcairn, which stated that \[t]ests, demonstra-
tions, and experiments... [which] are in keeping with the legitimate business of
the... [alleged infringer]" are infringements for which \[e]xperimental use is not
44See Roche, 733 F.2d at 861, 867.
45Id. at 861.
46See id. (citing 35 U.S.C. x 271(a) (1994); Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 484 (1964); Coakwell v. United States, 372 F.2d 508, 510
(1967)). Section 271(a) states: \Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, oers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C. x 271(a).
47See Roche, 733 F.2d at 862.
48Id.
11a defense,"49the court held that the experimental use doctrine does not apply to
the \limited use of a patented drug for testing and investigation strictly related
to FDA approval requirements during the last six months of the term of the
patent."50The court made a strong and eloquent statement of its interpretation
of the law:
Bolar's intended use of urazepam hcl to derive FDA required test data is...
an infringement of the [Roche] patent. Bolar may intend to perform \experi-
ments," but unlicensed experiments conducted with a view to the adaptation
of the patented invention to the experimentor's business is a violation of the
rights of the patentee to exclude others from using his patented invention. It is
obvious here that it is a misnomer to call the intended use de minimus. It is no
trie in its economic eect on the parties, even if the quantity used is small. It
is no dilettante aair such as Justice Story envisioned. We cannot construe the
experimental use rule so broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in
the guise of \scientic inquiry," when that inquiry has denite, cognizable, and
not insubstantial commercial purposes.51
This language suggests that the Federal Circuit intended for the experimen-
tal use doctrine to be unavailable whenever a defendant's research was moti-
vated, even in part, by a commercial purpose.52 In closing, the Federal Circuit
addressed in detail two signicant problems encountered by drug manufacturers
as a result of FDA regulation. First, the court cited a study indicating that it
could take from seven to ten years to obtain FDA approval for new drugs.53The
49Pitcairn, 547 F.2d at 1125{26.
50Roche, 733 F.2d at 861.
51Id. at 863.
52See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 1023 (making this observation and noting that,
as a practical matter, this could place severe limitations on the experimental use exception
in elds of research of commercial signicance, in which even academic research will often be
motivated at least in part by commercial interest).
53See Roche, 733 F.2d at 864 (citing National Academy of Engineering, The Com-
petitive Status of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry 79{80 (1983)); see also Jerey P.
Cohen, The Beginnings: Laboratory and Animal Studies, FDA Consumer (Nov. 1987), re-
vised as reprinted in FDA Consumer Special Report on New Drug Development in the United
12court noted that this delay in FDA approval whittled away at the length of the
eective patent term. Second, the court stated that research-oriented drug man-
ufacturers, by enjoining the use of patented drugs for testing purposes until their
patents expired, could use the threat of a patent infringement claim to prevent
competing uses of the patented invention by generic drug companies beyond the
intended seventeen year statutory term.54After describing these problems, how-
ever, the court observed that it was not its place to resolve the conict between
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)55and the Patent Act of
1952's respective policies and purposes.56Although noting the tension between
the patent law and the drug approval laws, the court concluded that \[i]t is the
role of Congress to maximize public welfare through legislation. Congress is well
aware of the economic and societal problems which the parties debate here, and
has before it legislation with respect to these issues. No matter how persuasive
the policy arguments are for or against these proposed bills, the court is not the
proper forum in which to debate them."57
III. Roche Overruled: The Legislative History and Intent
States (Jan. 1995), available in FDA, The Beginnings: Laboratory and Animal Studies (vis-
ited Jan. 18, 2000) <http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/newdrug/begin.html>.
54See Roche, 733 F.2d at 864.
5521 U.S.C. xx 301{92 (1982).
56See Roche, 733 F.2d at 863{64 (\We decline the opportunity here... to engage in legislative
activity proper only for the Congress.").
57Id. at 865 (\[I]t is not our job to apply laws that have not yet been written." (quoting
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 796 (1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted))); see also Timothy John McCoy, FDA Medical Device Approval:
The Noninfringing Experimental Use Defense Is Expanded: Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic,
Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2683 (1990), 14 Hamline L. Rev. 201, 219{20 (1990).
13Underlying x 271(e)(1)
The Federal Circuit's refusal in Roche to address the conict between the
FDA's drug approval process and the patent law spurred debate within the
pharmaceutical industry and among consumer groups.58 In order to remedy
distortions of the law and threats to the generic drug industry's viability that
the Roche holding was thought to create, Congress enacted the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. This Act modied both
the FDCA and the Federal Patent Code59and attempted to create a compromise
between the conicting interests of established, research-oriented manufacturers
and emerging, production-oriented generic manufacturers.60
A.
Regulatory Enigmas: Pre-1984 Pioneer and Generic Drug Manufacturer
Conicts61
58See J. Matthew Buchanan, Medical Device Patent Rights in the Age of FDA Moderniza-
tion: The Potential Eect of Regulatory Streamlining on the Right to Exclude, 30 U. Tol. L.
Rev. 305, 318 (1999); Susan Kopp Keyack, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984: Is it a Healthy Long Term Solution?, 21 Rutgers L.J. 147, 154
(1989).
59See Buchanan, supra note 58, at 314{15.
60See McCoy, supra note 57, at 220; see also James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition
and Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, 35 Cath. U. L. Rev. 433, 435 (1986); Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton
Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 269, 291
(1985).
61Drugs and the companies that produce them are classied according to their approach to
the market. \Pioneer" companies, also known as innovator companies, devote signicant time
and resources to the research and development of new drugs, also known as \pioneer" drugs,
\breakthrough" drugs, or \name brand" drugs. \Generic" drug companies are companies that
do not typically engage in novel research, but instead copy the active ingredients of pioneer
drugs in order to compete with a name brand product in the marketplace. See Joseph P.
Reid, A Generic Drug Price Scandal: Too Bitter a Pill for the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act to Swallow?, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 309, 339 n.18 (1999).
Because copying a product is signicantly less expensive than developing a drug from scratch,
generic drug manufacturers are able to oer their products to consumers at a considerable
savings. See Ned Milenkovich, Deleting the Bolar Amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act:
14Before the enactment of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, manufacturers of generic forms of patented pharmaceu-
ticals had to undergo the same lengthy regulatory approval process as pioneer
drug companies.62 This requirement presented eciency losses due to redun-
dancy and because generic drug manufacturers could not initiate the regulatory
approval process before the expiration of the pioneer company's patent without
risking liability for patent infringement.63\Consequently, there was no immedi-
ate competition in the marketplace following patent expiration, and the patent
holder realized a de facto extension of the expired patent."64Thus, the intersec-
tion of the patent law and the FDA drug approval process created an unintended
\grace period," during which pioneer drug manufacturers continued to enjoy de
facto market exclusivity, even after the expiration of their patents.65 Despite
this grace period, pioneer drug companies also struggled with diculties cre-
ated by the FDA approval process, because large portions of their patent terms
Harmonizing Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in a Global Village, 32 J. Marshall L. Rev.
751, 752{53 & n.23 (1999).
62See, e.g., Thomas F. Poche, The Clinical Trial Exemption From Patent Infringement:
Judicial Interpretation of Section 271(e)(1), 74 B.U. L. Rev. 903, 912 (1994) (observing
that the FDCA imposed burdens on generic drug manufacturers because generic versions of
previously approved pioneer drugs were considered \new drugs" for the purposes of FDCA
applications). \As a result, generic drug manufacturers had to duplicate the expensive NDA
process that the inventor and pioneering manufacturer had undergone." Id.
63See Buchanan, supra note 58, at 308; Reid, supra note 61, at 314 (observing that because
of pioneer drug patents and FDA requirements for clinical trials, generic manufacturers faced
delay in their ability to get products into the marketplace).
64Buchanan, supra note 58, at 308; see also Roche, 733 F.2d at 864 (stating that pioneer
companies \gain for themselves... a de facto monopoly of upwards of two years by enjoining
FDA-required testing of a generic drug until the patent on the drug's active ingredient ex-
pires").
65See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, 496 U.S. 661, 670 (1990) (\[T]he patentee's de facto
monopoly would continue for an often substantial period until regulatory approval was ob-
tained."); see also Buchanan, supra note 58, at 308.
15were sacriced to the FDA's premarket regulatory review of new drug prod-
ucts.66Because of the stricter FDA controls enacted in 1962, which mandated
exacting clinical trials and an elongated review period, pioneer drug companies
fought to maintain economic viability.67Pioneer productivity was reduced to \an
average of seventeen new drugs annually between 1963 and 1972, and to twelve
in 1980."68The pioneer drug companies struggled with the increased cost of de-
velopment that resulted from the FDA's elaborate testing requirements.69The
pioneer companies also experienced decreasing returns on investment, as the
FDA approval process consumed greater portions of the seventeen year patent
term.70As pioneer drug companies attempted to recoup these losses through
raising prices, aggressively litigating their patent rights,71and lobbying legisla-
tures for \antisubstitution" laws,72 consumers endured higher pharmaceutical
prices and decreased product choice.
66See, e.g., Reid, supra note 61, at 313.
67See id. (observing that following the FDCA amendments of 1962, the pioneer drug
industry \took a step backwards").
68Id.
69One study suggests that it requires twelve to nineteen years for a patentee to recover
both initial investment cost and a reasonable rate of return on an invention. See Henry G.
Grabowski & John M. Vernon, A Sensitivity Analysis of Expected Protability of Pharma-
ceutical Research and Development, 3 Man. & Decision Econ. 36 (1982).
70See Alan D. Lourie, A Review of Recent Patent Term Extension Data, 71 J. Pat. Off.
Soc'y 171, 174 (1989) (reviewing the time required to perform clinical testing and to obtain
FDA approval for sixty-ve patented human pharmaceuticals); see also Poche, supra note 62,
at 912 (\Because the FDA approval process consumes one-third to one-half of the patent term
for an average product, this substantially reduces the likelihood that an inventor will recoup
her investment costs, and thus diminishes the incentive to invest."); Reid, supra note 61, at
314.
71See Keyack, supra note 58, at 152{53 (discussing the increased number of civil lawsuits
for patent infringement by pioneer drug companies between 1962 and 1984).
72See id. at 153 n.42. \Antisubstitution" statutes prohibited pharmacists from substituting
generic drugs for brand name drugs. See id., Reid, supra note 61, at 314 & n.33.
16Following the Roche decision, which acted as a impetus for change,73both pio-
neer and generic drug manufacturers called upon Congress to remedy the per-
ceived failures of the marketplace caused by the intersection of the patent law
and FDA regulations.74Consumer groups and generic drug manufacturers ar-
gued that generic drug manufacturers should have earlier access to the FDA
approval process, in order to bring their products to market after the expiration
of the pioneer drug patents. In turn, manufacturers of brand name pharma-
ceuticals lobbied Congress for extended patent terms, to compensate for the
time that they expended on FDA clinical trials and approval.75\The goal of
the pharmaceutical lobbyists was to induce passage of a bill that would allow
restoration of portions of the patent life lost in the premarket regulatory review
of new drug products (e.g., FDA approval procedures). Competing with this
objective was that of the consumer groups which called for a quicker entry into
the market for generic drug manufacturers."76
B.
Seeking Reconciliation Through the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
Through the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, Congress attempted to minimize the amount of time between the ex-
piration of a pioneer drug company's patent and the availability of approved
73See Keyack, supra note 58, at 154{55 (citing the Roche decision as providing a political
stimulus for both generic and pioneer drug manufacturers).
74See Poche, supra note 62, at 913 & n.78.
75See id. at 913 n.78.
76Christiansen, supra note 4, at 616; see also Wheaton, supra note 60, at 440.
17generic competitors, while continuing to balance the needs of pioneer drug com-
panies and their incentives to innovate.77The Act consists of two titles. Title I
describes \Abbreviated New Drug Applications" (ANDAs),78 and Title II ad-
dresses \Patent Term Restoration."791. 35 U.S.C. x 156. | The rst element
of Title II of the DPCPTR Act is 35 U.S.C. x 156.80This provision arose out of
Congress's recognition that pioneer drug companies' incentives to innovate were
diminished because FDA premarket approval requirements reduced the eective
patent life of their inventions.81In response to this problem, Congress enacted x
156, which extends the patent term for products that are subject to a regulatory
review period before commercial marketing and use.82To qualify for a patent
77See, e.g., Milenkovich, supra note 61, at 754{55 (describing three goals of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act: \(1) encourage generic `competition' in the
pharmaceutical industry by streamlining the process of regulatory approval for generics, (2)
stimulate investment in pharmaceutical research and development by restoring to the patent
owner a part of the patent term consumed by regulatory delay, and (3) facilitate immediate
competition in the marketplace upon patent expiration by securing for the generic industry
an exemption from infringement activities relating to FDA submissions") (internal citations
omitted).
78Title I signicantly altered 21 U.S.C. x 355, part of the FDCA, by creating a new process
for obtaining abbreviated new drug approval. \Under this new system, any party meeting the
statutory conditions could le an ANDA and would receive an answer from the FDA within
180 days. The conditions were specically tailored to t the generic drug industry: they
essentially required an informational showing that the ANDA drug was similar or identical
in all important respects to a pre-existing, FDA-approved drug, and a certication that the
new drug would not infringe upon any pre-existing drug's patent." Reid, supra note 61, at
317 (internal citations omitted). Title I also established grounds upon which the FDA can
reject an ANDA or withdraw ANDA approval in the interest of safety. See id. at 317{18.
A full discussion of Title I of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
and the ANDA process is beyond the scope of this essay. See generally Peter Barton Hutt
& James C. Morrison, Abbreviated New Drug Applications (1985); Brinckerho, supra
note 12, at 643{45; Wheaton, supra note 60, at 458 (discussing the new ANDA procedure for
gaining approval of generic drugs)
79See generally Rathe, supra note 30, at 632.
8035 U.S.C. x 156 (1994).
81See Rathe, supra note 30, at 632{33.
82See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17{18 (1984) (stating that,
because the eective life of patents has decreased because of Federal premarketing regulations,
innovation has declined). Section 156 was expected to create a \signicant, new incentive
18term extension under x 156, a drug company must satisfy several requirements.
\First, the term of the patent must not have expired before an application is
submitted to the Commissioner for its extension. Second, the term of the patent
must not have been extended previously, and the patented product must have
been subject to a regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or
use. Finally, the product must be an `approved product."'83Section 156 con-
tains the following list of \approved products": \(A) A human drug product.
(B) Any medical device, food additive, or color additive subject to regulation
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act."84
2. The Role of 35 U.S.C. x 271(e)(1). | The second element of Title II's
delicate balancing of interests is the codication of the experimental use doc-
trine as a defense to patent infringement claims in x 271(e)(1) of the Act.85This
provision of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
created an exception to the patent infringement statute that permits a manu-
facturer of a generic form of a patented drug to conduct activities that would
otherwise constitute infringement as long as the activities are \solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information to the
which would result in increased expenditures for research and development." H.R. Rep. No.
98-857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1984).
83Rathe, supra note 30, at 633 (citing 35 U.S.C. x 156(a)(1){(5)).
8435 U.S.C. x 156(f)(1). The maximum extension available under x 156 was limited to four-
teen years of market exclusivity from the date of FDA approval, because Congress recognized
that some of pioneer drug companies' lost marketing time results from necessary development
eort, rather than government delay. See Engelberg, supra note 7, at 390 n.4.
85See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, 496 U.S. 661 (1990); see also McCoy, supra note 57,
at 221.
19FDA."86Through its enactment of x 271(e)(1), Congress overruled the Roche de-
cision.87Congress rejected the strong language and reasoning of the Roche case,
stating that \experimental activity does not have any adverse economic im-
pact on the patent owner's exclusivity during the life of the patent."88Congress
hoped that x 271(e)(1) would enable generic drug manufacturers to use patented
drugs to obtain premarketing approval, which would make less expensive generic
equivalents of brand name drugs available to consumers eighteen months to two
years earlier than under the system established by Roche.89Thus, in x 271(e)(1),
Congress espoused a much narrower vision of proscribed commercial activity
than that suggested by the Federal Circuit in Roche.90As a result, testing by
generic drug companies prior to the expiration of a patent term, which would
have been held infringing under Roche, was deemed permissible, despite the
companies' clear competitive purpose.91
8635 U.S.C. x 271(e)(1).
87See Pub. L. No. 98-417, Title II, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 27 (1984) (stating that \[t]he provisions of [x 271(e)(1)] have the net
eect of reversing the holding of the court in Roche"); H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess, pt. 1, at 45{46 (1984) (same); see also Brinckerho, supra note 12, at 645; Rathe, supra
note 30, at 632.
88H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 46, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2679; see also H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 8, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2692 ( \The patent owner retains the right to exclude others from the
major commercial marketplace during the life of the patent. Thus, the nature of the interfer-
ence with the rights of the patent holder is not substantial.").
89See Brinckerho, supra note 12, at 645 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 2, at 29 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2713).
90See Israelsen, supra note 24, at 464 & n.33.
91See Rathe, supra note 30, at 632.
20Although it is clear that x 271(e)(1) was intended to overrule Roche, Congress
did not provide much information about whether the provision was intended
reach beyond the specic facts presented by that case.92As written, the excep-
tion appears to oer broad-sweeping protection to any putative infringer who
uses a patented invention to acquire information required to be submitted under
a federal law regulating drugs or veterinary biological products.93The legislative
history of the provision, however, suggests that Congress was concerned with
a smaller range of activities, a narrower class of infringers, and specic types
of patented inventions.94For example, the House Judiciary Committee report
stated that \the only activity that will be permitted by the bill is a limited
amount of testing so that generic manufacturers can establish the bioequiva-
lency of a generic substitute."95The report of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce further elaborated:
The information which can be developed under this provision is the type
which is required to obtain approval of the drug....
The purpose of Sections 271(e)(1) and (2) is to establish that experimentation
with a patented drug product, when the purpose is to prepare for commercial
activity which will begin after a valid patent expires, is not a patent infringe-
ment.96
92See Brinckerho, supra note 12, at 648{49 (\Because Congress clearly expressed its intent
to overrule Roche, it can be assumed that it intended at least these types of activities to fall
within section 271(e)(1). Congress may not have contemplated the application of the statute
to any other activities.").
93See id. at 647{48 (\[The exception] appears to apply to any activity reasonably related
to obtaining premarket approval, and to any patented invention that would be infringed in
the course of conducting such activities.").
94See id.
95H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 8, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686,
2692.
96Id. at 45, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678.
21Similarly, although the statute does not facially restrict its applicability to
any class of infringer, the legislative history suggests that the provision was
drafted to benet generic drug manufacturers alone. The legislative history
describes the exception as providing that \it is not an act of patent infringement
for a generic drug maker to... test a patented drug,"97and states that the
provision is intended to enable \a generic drug manufacturer... [to] obtain a
supply of a patented drug product during the life of the patent."98
IV. Judicial Interpretation of the x 271(e)(1) Exemption for
Experimental Use
Because of the ambiguity of x 271(e)(1)'s language and the apparent conict
between its stated provisions and its legislative history, courts have struggled
to dene its parameters. Several decisions interpreting section 271(e)(1), which
highlight its indeterminacy, followed shortly after its enactment.99
A. The Scripps Cases: Range of Infringing Activities Protected Under x
271(e)(1)
1. Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech Inc. | The rst pub-
lished decision interpreting x 271(e)(1) arose in Scripps Clinic & Research Foun-
dation v. Genentech Inc.,100a lawsuit involving several biotechnology patents
97H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648 (emphasis added).
98Id. at 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2689 (emphasis added).
99See generally McCoy, supra note 57, at 221{22 (cataloging decisions).
100231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 978, 979 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
22on Factor VIII:C.101Scientists at Genentech began research to produce Factor
VIII:C through recombinant DNA technology before the Scripps patents issued
and continued these eorts after the patents issued.102After Genentech used
Scripps's patented product, puried Factor VIII:C, to determine its amino acid
sequence, clone the Factor VIII:C gene, and produce Factor VIII:C by recombi-
nant DNA techniques, Scripps sued Genentech for patent infringement, seeking
damages and an injunction against further use by Genentech of puried Factor
VIII:C.103The court focused on the \solely for" language of x 271(e)(1) and re-
fused to apply the experimental use exception to Genentech's activities because,
although they might eventually lead to submission of data to the FDA, that was
not the company's \sole purpose."104The court concluded that Genentech's use
of puried Factor VIII:C therefore constituted infringement.1052. Scripps Clinic
& Research Foundation v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. | In Scripps
Clinic & Research Foundation v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc.,106a case
101The patents at issue in the case arose out of Scripps's development of a process for
purifying and concentrating Factor VIII:C, a protein that plays an essential role in blood
clotting, from human and animal blood plasma. The patents included claims to both the
process of purifying Factor VIII:C and the concentrated Factor VIII:C product itself. See
Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (N.D. Cal.
1987); see also Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 1079{80.
102See Genentech, 666 F. Supp. at 1384.
103See Genentech, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 979.
104See id. at 980.
105See id. at 979{80. In a second decision, on renewed motion, the court rearmed its earlier
interpretation of x 271(e)(1), holding that \a multiple purpose use of a patent invention was
not immunized, where only one purpose was related to FDA testing." Israelsen, supra note 24,
at 465{66 (citing Genentech, 666 F. Supp. at 1396). The court rejected Genentech's argument
that all the purposes were \reasonably related" to meeting the reporting requirements of the
FDA. It narrowly interpreted x 271(e)(1)'s legislative history as establishing that the only use
permitted by the statute was testing to establish bioequivalency. See id.
1067 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1562 (D. Del. 1998).
23which also involved Factor VIII:C, Baxter defended against Scripps's charges
of infringement, asserting that its activities were protected under x 271(e)(1).
Although Baxter had used Factor VIII:C to generate data both for FDA premar-
keting approval and to submit to foreign regulatory agencies, the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware denied Scripps's motion.107The court
stated that the Genentech court had interpreted x 271(e)(1) overly narrowly and
without regard to the \reasonably related" language of the statute:
The question of law, then, is whether any foreign activities can be \reason-
ably related" to FDA approval. If not, then Baxter's activities would fall outside
of Section 271(e)(1) and Baxter's defense would be insucient.... [The Genen-
tech court] was faced with this issue, but [it] interpreted the statute only to cover
activities that were \solely related" to FDA approval and did not consider what
acts are \reasonably related" to it.108
Such reliance on one element of the statute at the expense of its other ele-
ments was in error, the court argued. In conclusion, the court observed that x
271(e)(1)'s legislative history failed to \provide guidance" on the matter of in-
terpretation and suggested that the doctrine needed to be \more fully developed
before the Court... decide[s] it."109
B. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.: Range of Inventions Protected Under x
271(e)(1)
The Scripps cases highlight courts' attempts to determine the range of in-
fringing activities exempted under x 271(e)(1). But courts have also experienced
107See Baxter, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1565.
108Id. at 1564{65 (noting that the \scope of section 271(e)(1)... has no clear answer"); see
also Israelsen, supra note 24, at 466.
109Id.
24diculty in determining the types of products that are exempt from patent in-
fringement charges under x 271(e)(1). The plain language of the statute is not
plain at all, but rather refers cryptically to \a patented invention" and \a Fed-
eral law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary
biological products."110In 1990, the Supreme Court was called upon to deter-
mine the scope of the products exempted by x 271(e)(1) in Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc.111In 1983, Eli Lilly's predecessor in interest sued Medtronic in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seek-
ing to enjoin Medtronic from testing and marketing an implantable heart deb-
rillator.112Medtronic called upon x 271(e)(1), claiming that its activities were
\reasonably related to the development and submission of information" under
the FDCA, and thus were exempted from infringement under the statute.113The
district court rejected Medtronic's argument, holding that x 271(e)(1) did not
apply to the development and submission of information related to medical de-
vices.114 Although the court acknowledged that such devices are \patented
inventions," the sale of which is \regulated" by the FDCA, it interpreted x
271(e)(1) as providing an exemption for drugs only.115On appeal, the Court of
11035 U.S.C. x 271(e)(1).
111496 U.S. 661 (1990). \This case presents the question whether 35 U.S.C. x 271(e)(1)
(1982 ed., Supp. V) renders activities that would otherwise constitute patent infringement
noninfringing if they are undertaken for the purpose of developing and submitting to the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) information necessary to obtain marketing approval for a
medical device under x 515 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 90 Stat.
552, 21 U.S.C. x 360e." Id. at 663{64 (emphasis added).
112See id. at 664.
113See id.
114See id.
115See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1760, 1761 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
25Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling, \holding that
by virtue of x 271(e)(1), [Medtronic's] activities could not constitute infringe-
ment if they had been undertaken to develop information reasonably related to
the development and submission of information necessary to obtain regulatory
approval under the FDCA."116The court determined that the x 271(e)(1) ex-
emption is not limited to drugs, but extends as well to medical devices that are
subject to FDA approval.117The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and, in a
6{2 decision,118armed.119Rather than considering the language of the individ-
ual statutory provisions separately, in his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia
relied on the structure of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restora-
tion Act as a whole,120 and concluded that the phrase \patented invention" in
x 271(e)(1) is \dened to include all inventions, not drug-related inventions
alone."121The Court rejected Eli Lilly's contention that the statutory phrase
\a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs" referred
only to those individual provisions of federal law that regulate drugs, rather
116Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 664.
117See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
118Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justice Kennedy led a dissenting
opinion, in which Justice White joined. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case.
119See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 679.
120See id. at 665{66; see also David J. Bloch, If It's Regulated Like a Duck... Uncertainties
in Implementing the Patent Exceptions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 111, 113 (1999) (discussing the Eli Lilly decision and
the scope of x 271(e)(1)).
121Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665 (citing 35 U.S.C. x 100(a) (\When used in this title unless the
context otherwise indicates... [t]he term `invention' means invention or discovery.")).
26than to the entirety of any Act in which at least some of the provisions relate to
drugs.122Instead, the Court adopted Medtronic's broader reading, concluding
that \the phrase `a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs' more naturally summons up the image of an entire statutory scheme of
regulation."123This reading, the Court asserted, was supported by the historical
meaning of the phrase \a Federal law," which typically refers to an entire act
or scheme of regulation, rather than to individual provisions of an act.124The
Court also noted that if Congress had intended to refer only to drug products in
the statute, then there were \innitely more clear and simple ways of expressing
that intent and it is hard to believe the convoluted manner petitioner suggests
was employed would have been selected."125Because he believed that the text
of the provision was \not plainly comprehensible on anyone's view,"126however,
Justice Scalia next considered the structure of the statute as a whole.127Justice
Scalia concluded that the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restora-
tion Act of 1984 was \designed to respond to two unintended distortions of the
122See id. at 665{66. Under Eli Lilly's interpretation, products regulated under the drug and
veterinary biologics provision of the FDCA would be eligible for x 271(e)(1) exemption, but
those regulated under the Act's other provisions would not. Therefore, Medtronic's submission
of information under 21 U.S.C. x 360(e), which dealt with devices, not drugs, would not be
shielded from a patent infringement action. See Bloch, supra note 120, at 113.
123Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 666.
124See id. at 666{67.
125Id. at 667. For example, the provision might have read: \It shall not be an act of
infringement to make, use, or sell a patented drug invention... solely for uses reasonably related
to the development and submission of information required, as a condition of manufacture,
use, or sale, by Federal law." Id.
126Id. at 669. The Court ignored the legislative history of the provision, asserting that it
\shed[] no clear light." Id.
127See id.
27seventeen-year patent term produced by the requirement that certain products
must receive premarket regulatory approval":128
First, the holder of a patent relating to such products would as a practical
matter not be able to reap any nancial rewards during the early years of the
term. When an inventor makes a potentially useful discovery, he ordinarily
protects it by applying for a patent at once. Thus, if the discovery relates to
a product that cannot be marketed without substantial testing and regulatory
approval, the \clock" on his patent term will be running even though he is not
yet able to derive any prot from the invention.
The second distortion occurred at the other end of the patent term. In 1984,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided that the manufacture, use,
or sale of a patented invention during the term of the patent constituted infringe-
ment... even if it was for the sole purpose of conducting tests and developing
information necessary to apply for regulatory approval. Since that activity could
not be commenced by those who planned to compete with the patentee until
expiration of the entire patent term, the patentees de facto monopoly would
continue for an often substantial period until regulatory approval was obtained.
In other words, the combined eect of the patent law and the premarket regu-
latory approval requirement was to create an eective extension of the patent
term.129
Because the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
sought to eliminate this distortion from both ends of the patent period, the
Court concluded that the patent term extension provisions of the Act should
apply to all FDCA-regulated products, whether drugs or devices.130The Court
found further support for this interpretation from the textual indications of xx
201 and 202 of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,
because the two sections contain complementary omissions and inclusions. \In-
terpreting x 271(e)(1) as the Court of Appeals did here appears to create a
perfect `product' t between the two sections. All of the products eligible for a
128Id.
129Id.
130See id. at 671{73.
28patent term extension under x 201 are subject to x 202, since all of them | med-
ical devices, food additives, color additives, new drugs, antibiotic drugs, and hu-
man biological products | are subject to premarket approval under various pro-
visions of the FDCA... or under the [Public Health Service]131Act."132Because
the sections of the statute appear to be intended to balance each other, the Court
concluded that products that gain the benets of x 201 should also be subject
to the limitations of x 202, and vice versa. As a result, it held that medical
devices are included in the x 271(e)(1) exemption from patent infringement.133
Writing in dissent, Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice White joined, argued
that the majority opinion applied a meaning to x 271(e)(1) that was contrary
to the most plausible reading of the statute.134Justice Kennedy proposed that
x 271(e)(1)'s text should be read narrowly, because it explicitly identies drugs,
while failing to mention any other type of invention.135Justice Kennedy believed
that it would be inappropriate to expand x 271(e)(1)'s exemption to include a
broader range of products, merely because they are regulated under the same
statute that regulates drugs.136
C.
Scripps Revisited: Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Co. and
13158 Stat. 682, as amended, 42 U.S.C. x 201, et. seq.
132Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 673{74.
133See Bloch, supra note 120, at 115.
134See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 679 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
135See id. at 680.
136See id.
29Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.
After the Supreme Court extended the scope of x 271(e)(1) beyond generic
drugs to medical devices and other products subject to an FDA approval pro-
cess in Eli Lilly, courts' interpretation of the scope of infringing activities pro-
tected by the provision underwent a similar expansion.137In the Ventritex cases,
plaintis brought suit against Ventritex for allegedly infringing their patents on
implantable pacemakers.138Ventritex defended by claiming exemption under x
271(e)(1), because it was a potential manufacturer of a patented medical device
subject to the FDA approval process. These cases presented the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California with an opportunity to
reevaluate its stance in the \solely for" versus \reasonably related" debate and
oered the Federal Circuit its rst opportunity to address the issue.
1. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Co. | In Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex,
Co.,139the plainti accused Ventritex of engaging in a broad range of infringing
activities, including selling the patented devices in the United States, where the
devices were used in clinical trials; making and selling the patented devices to
international distributors, where the distributors resold them to FDA-approved
clinical investigators; permitting testing of the devices by German ocials,
where testing was a prerequisite to German import approval; testing the devices
137See Bloch, supra note 120, at 121.
138See Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (N.D. Cal. 1991), a'd,
991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (unpublished opinion); Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v.
Ventritex, Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1960 (N.D. Cal. 1991), a'd, 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
139775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
30in Germany, where the test results were submitted to the FDA; and demonstrat-
ing the devices at trade shows.140At trial, Intermedics claimed that Ventritex
could not use its clinical trial data, gathered under the protection of x 271(e)(1),
for such \collateral activities,"141because they were not \solely for uses reason-
ably related" to obtaining FDA approval.142The United States District Court for
the Northern District of California rejected Intermedics's argument and reeval-
uated the narrow interpretation of x 271(e)(1) that it had adopted in Genen-
tech.143The court \invoked the `reasonably related' language of section 271(e)(1)
to exempt a broad range of activities from infringement,"144ultimately conclud-
ing that if it would have been reasonable for a party in the defendant's position
to believe that there was a \decent prospect" that the use in question would
contribute to the generation of information relevant to the FDA approval pro-
cess, then that use is protected under x 271(e)(1).145The court determined that
Congress used the phrase \reasonably related" in order to communicate \its
intention that the courts give parties some latitude in making judgments about
140See Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1282; see also Brinckerho, supra note 12, at 649.
141Id. at 1281; see also Poche, supra note 62, at 919. Ventritex also used its clinical data
to solicit investment capital to fund additional trials, to prepare for production after the
expiration of the patent term, and to apply for import approval and patent rights in foreign
countries. See Poche, supra note 62, at 919.
142Intermedics, 774 F. Supp. at 1276.
143See Scripps Clinic & Research Fund v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1396 (N.D.
Cal. 1987) (holding that collateral activities, not solely related to FDA approval, consti-
tute infringement). Although the court did not explicitly repudiate its Genentech holding
in Intermedics, it later did so in Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Systems,
24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1226, 1232{33 (N.D. Cal. 1992), in which it adopted the Intermedics
court's interpretation of x 271(e)(1) and overruled its earlier interpretation in Genentech.
144Brinckerho, supra note 12, at 649.
145Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1280.
31the nature and extent of the otherwise infringing activities that they would en-
gage in as they sought to develop information to satisfy the FDA."146\[T]he
court vigorously resisted any attempt to limit [a defendant manufacturer's] col-
lateral use of data that was otherwise properly collected under the x 271(e)(1)
exemption."147
2. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc. | The Federal
Circuit had an opportunity to expand upon the debate over the \solely for"
versus \reasonably related" language of x 271(e)(1) in Telectronics Pacing Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.148In Telectronics, Ventritex had conducted clinical
trials on its version of Telectronics's patented implantable debrillators in or-
der to obtain data required by the FDA.149After Ventritex used the results of
these clinical trials for fundraising and displayed its device at medical confer-
ences, Telectronics sued, arguing that Ventritex's uses were not exempt under x
271(e)(1) because they were not \solely for uses reasonably related to FDA ap-
proval."150Thus, the Northern District of California was called upon once again
to address Ventritex's use of clinical trial data to raise investment capital.151The
146Id. at 1280.
147Poche, supra note 62, at 919. The Federal Circuit armed the Intermedics decision in an
unpublished opinion, without substantial analysis of the scope of x 271(e)(1). See Intermedics,
Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525, 1525{29 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
148982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Because the Federal Circuit armed Intermedics in an
unpublished decision, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1993), Telectronics was its rst
published decision addressing this debate. See Brinckerho, supra note 12, at 649 n.63.
149See Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1521{22.
150Id. at 1522{23.
151See Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1960,
1960 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
32district court adhered to the position that it had espoused in Intermedics and
held that such collateral activity did not void x 271(e)(1)'s exemption.152
On appeal, the Federal Circuit conducted a two-step analysis of Ventritex's
activities, rst determining whether its activities fell within the denition of in-
fringement set forth in x 271(a), and then determining whether its activities fell
within the x 271(e)(1) exemption.153 \The court found that Ventritex's demon-
strations of its debrillator at medical conferences were unauthorized uses of
Telectronics's invention that would fall under section 271(a), but that they were
exempt from infringement under section 271(e)(1) because of Ventritex's need
to nd qualied investigators to conduct clinical trials. The court characterized
Ventritex's other activities as `dissemination of... data developed for FDA ap-
proval,' which is not an act of infringement under section 271(a)."154The court
atly rejected Telectronics's assertion that Ventritex's use of its clinical data
for non-regulatory purposes should place its activities outside of x 271(e)(1)'s
scope. Because the data was initially gathered for FDA-approval purposes, the
court determined that x 271(e)(1)'s exemption should remain available, despite
Ventritex's use of the data for collateral fundraising activities.155
152See id.
153See Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1523.
154Brinckerho, supra note 12, at 650.
155See Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1523{24 (\[Section 271(e)(1) is not] revoked when the re-
sulting data is later used for non-FDA reporting purposes.").
33This interpretation of x 271(e)(1) was consistent with its legislative history,
the court asserted, because through its statutory enactment, Congress intended
to place generic drug manufacturers \in a position to market their products as
soon as... legally permissible."156The court presumed that this intent was su-
ciently broad to encompass fundraising activities, because of the need of generic
manufactures to \raise funds for developing and testing" their products.157The
court concluded that preventing generic drug manufacturers from using their
clinical data for \fundraising and other business purposes" would inhibit their
ability to compete in the marketplace.158Therefore, the court refused to impose
any limitation on collateral uses of clinical data initially developed for submis-
sion to the FDA.159
D. Return to Eli Lilly: Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp.
Although Eli Lilly settled conclusively x 271(e)(1)'s applicability to medical
devices, the Court's reliance on x 201 of the DPCPTR Act to interpret the
statutory framework created a new area of uncertainty.160\By relying on the
impact of premarket approval requirements, with their attendant regulatory
delays, in section 201 to fashion its interpretation of section 202, the Court




159See Brinckerho, supra note 12, at 650.
160See Bloch, supra note 120, at 115.
34the most demanding premarket approval process can claim protection under
section 202."161Because the FDCA subjects various types of medical devices
to dierent regulatory review requirements, it is unclear whether all classes of
medical devices are subject to the same protection under x 271(e)(1).162
In Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp.,163the District of Massachusetts held that Exitron's use of the patented invention to gather information required to satisfy the FDA's premarket notication requirements for Class II medical devices did not constitute infringement because the activities qualied for x 271(e)(1)'s exemption.164Abtox unsuccessfully argued that x 271(e)(1) should not apply to the invention at issue, a device for sterilizing medical instruments using partially ionized gas, because, as a Class II medical device, it would not be subject to the lengthy premarket regulatory approval process.165On appeal, the Federal Circuit166noted that this case presented \ a novel question of law," because the device at issue in Eli Lilly was a Class III medical device.167The court considered the plain language of x 271(e)(1), its legislative history, and the Supreme Court's decision in Eli Lilly, before concluding that the statute applied to all medical devices, regardless of FDA classication.168Although the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court's broad holding in Eli Lilly appeared to conict with the narrower reasoning that it applied in reaching that holding,169
it concluded that it was bound by the broader holding, \which remains in force despite a potential conict with its own narrower reasoning."170The court held that \[s]ection 271(e)(1) makes no distinctions based upon the dierent FDA classes of medical devices or drugs."171As a result of the Federal Circuit's holding in Abtox, x 271(e)(1)'s exemption now protects a broad array of activities and applies to all medical devices ranging from simple devices, such as tongue depressors, to complex cardiac debrillators.172
161Id.
162See id. at 115{16. The FDCA establishes three classes of medical devices for the purpose
of approval and regulation:
Class I devices, dened as those (1) for which general controls, such as the prohibitions
on adulteration and misbranding, are sucient to provide reasonable assurance of safety and
eectiveness, or (2) if such assurance is not available, those devices that are not represented
for use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial importance
in preventing impairment of human health, and which do not present a potential unreasonable
risk of illness or injury;
Class II devices, dened as those for which the general controls used for Class I devices
are insucient to provide reasonable assurance of safety and eectiveness, and for which
there is sucient information to establish special controls, such as performance standards and
postmarket surveillance, that will provide such assurance; and
Class III devices, which cannot be classied as either Class I or Class II devices because
insucient information exists to determine if the application of general or special controls will
provide reasonable assurance of safety and eectiveness, and which are purported for use in
supporting or sustaining life or for a use of substantial importance in preventing impairment
of human health, or which prevent an unreasonable risk of injury.
Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. x 360c(a)(1)(A){(C)).
163888 F. Supp. 6 (D. Mass. 1995).
164See id. at 9.
165See id.
166Abtox v. Exitron, 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
167Id. at 1028.
168See id. at 1027{30.
169See id. at 1029 (\Therefore, under the broad holding of Eli Lilly, all classes of medical
devices fall within the plain meaning of section 271(e)(1). Nevertheless, under the Court's
narrower justication of statutory symmetry, only Class III devices fall within the section.").
170Id.
171Id.
172See Buchanan, supra note 58, at 309. Abtox also rearmed the position, espoused in
the Ventritex cases, that data acquired under x 271(e)(1) can be used for collateral purposes
35V. Conclusion: The Future of x 271(e)(1)
Since its enactment over fteen years ago, courts have struggled to dene the
precise contours of x 271(e)(1)'s exemption from patent infringement in light
of its often unedifying legislative history and statutory text.173Even after all
this time, the scope of permissible noninfringing experimentation with patented
inventions remains unclear. Nevertheless, the courts' broadening interpretation
of x 271(e)(1),174which \currently allows competitor manufacturers of products
regulated by the FDA under the FDCA... to legally conduct a wide array
of otherwise infringing activities,"175suggests that generic drug companies will
without sacricing the provision's protection. See Abtox, 122 F.3d at 1030 (stating that the
statute permits a would-be infringer to \use its data... for more than FDA approval" and
that \alternative uses are irrelevant" to a defendant's ability to invoke the statute).
173See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 120, at 162 (observing that the \theme that runs through any
examination of [x 271(e)(1)] is the diculties courts face in interpreting congressional intent
in the face of vague statutory language").
174See, e.g., Coggio & Cerrito, supra note 11, at 347 (cataloguing the wide range of activities
that courts have held fall within the safe harbor of section 271(e)(1):
 using the drug product to raise capital (Intermedics; Telectronics);
 authorizing publications describing product features (Intermedics);
 circulating study results to a potential licensees (Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Ther-
apeutics Systems, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1226 (N.D. Cal. 1992));
 demonstrating features of the drugs product at scientic meetings and trade shows (In-
termedics; Telectronics; Chartex Int'l Plc. v. M.D. Personal Prods. Corp., 5 F.3d 1505, 1993
WL 306169 (Fed. Cir. 1993));
 acquiring import approval from a foreign government (Intermedics);
 arranging importation into a foreign country (Chartex);
 performing clinical studies for foreign regulatory agency clearance (Elan Transdermal;
NeoRx Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 205{06 (D.N.J. 1994));
 obtaining foreign patents (Intermedics);
 manufacturing a product to generate data and creating stockpiles (Intermedics; NeoRx);
 selling a product to clinical investigators at a hospital (Intermedics);
 selling a product to international distributors (Intermedics);
 testing a product in a foreign country by a clinical investigator (Intermedics; NeoRx);
 testing by foreign company (Intermedics);
 demonstrating the drug to physicians and non-physicians (Telectronics; Chartex);
 conducting consumer studies (Chartex);
 describing clinical trials to investors and journalists (Telectronics);
 promoting a product to customers (Abtox); and
 shipping a product to a potential commercial partner (NeoRx)).
175Buchanan, supra note 58, at 324. Furthermore, as long as the reasonably related require-
ment is met, the manufacturer need not actually submit the resulting information to the FDA
36continue to gain in the coming years at the expense of pioneer drug compa-
nies.176By virtue of its expansive interpretation by the courts, x 271(e)(1) has
placed an increasing strain on the ability of pioneer drug companies to innovate
and compete with generic drug companies.177By seemingly ignoring the fact
that it is far easier to copy a new drug than it is to invent one,178x 271(e)(1)
may skew drug manufacturers' incentives and fail to provide adequate patent
protection to for pioneer drug companies. \Strong patent protection gives the
inventive entity, as well as others, the incentive to continue to invent knowing
that their intellectual property will be secure while beneting society."179In the
absence of such strong protection, pioneer drug companies, confronted both by
the increased costs of innovation and increased encroachment of their patent
terms under x 271(e)(1), may become less inclined to devote time and resources
to pursuing innovative solutions to human ailments.
Section 271(e)(1)'s breadth should not be permitted to grow unchecked. If
in order to obtain protection under section 271(e)(1). See Abtox, 122 F.3d at 1027. The drug
manufacturer merely has to demonstrate a reasonable relation between his activities and the
development and submission of information to the FDA in order to benet under x 271(e)(1).
See Buchanan, supra note 58, at 324.
176See, e.g., Milenkovich, supra note 61, at 770 (describing the \[b]right [f]uture for
[g]enerics").
177See, e.g., Reid, supra note 61, at 339.
178See Milenkovich, supra note 61, at 752.
179Id. at 753 (citing Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 81{86
(1950)). If an inventor believes that his patent's value would be eroded by section 271(e)(1),
he may decide to keep his invention a trade secret instead of seeking patent protection. See
Brinckerho, supra note 12, at 658 n.152. Such conduct would undermine the fundamental
purpose of the patent system, which is intended to \promote the progress of... the useful arts"
by granting incentives to inventors who disclose their inventions to the public. U.S. Const.,
art. I, x 8, cl. 8.
37the trend of broad-sweeping judicial interpretation continues, x 271(e)(1) may
be interpreted to encompass an even broader range of inventions, new FDA
regulations, or activities only peripherally related to compliance with FDA re-
quirements.180The pharmaceutical industry currently stands alone in exempting
infringers from liability for violations of patent exclusivity.181Given the rarity
of a provision such as x 271(e)(1) in the patent law, the wisest course may be
to restrict the breadth of the clinical trial exemption.
180See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 58, at 329 (noting that x 271(e)(1) is not presently applied
to protect activities associated with compliance with the FDA's current Good Manufacturing
Practices (cGMP) or Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) for medical devices).
181See id. at 764{65.
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